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From fellow travellers to active drivers: Case study on African civil society participation in the Internet Governance Forum Ecosystem

January 2025

Executive summary

The participation of African civil society in the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) ecosystem reveals a complex interplay of opportunities, challenges, and outcomes. This case study, conducted by KICTANet under the Civil Society Alliance for Digital Empowerment (CADE) initiative, provides an in-depth analysis of the role and impact of African civil society organizations (CSOs) within this global framework.

The IGF ecosystem consists of annual global events, and intersessional activities such as Best Practice Forums (BPFs), Policy Networks (PNs), Dynamic Coalitions (DCs), and regional/national IGFs. African civil society has demonstrated significant engagement, particularly in regional and national IGFs, where 36 national and 7 regional initiatives exist across Africa. However, global participation remains uneven, influenced by event location and accessibility. For instance, African participation was 44% when the IGF was hosted in Ethiopia in 2022 but dropped to 8% in Japan in 2023.

Several factors have enabled African CSOs to engage with the IGF ecosystem. The hybrid format introduced post-COVID-19 has improved accessibility, allowing more participants to join remotely. Youth initiatives have been particularly successful, with African youth taking on leadership roles in organizing events like the Youth Track. Additionally, financial support through the IGF travel fund has facilitated participation for individuals from under-represented groups.

Despite these advancements, barriers persist. Limited financial resources and logistical challenges, such as visa difficulties, hinder attendance at global events. Structural issues within the IGF ecosystem also limit influence; for example, anonymous workshop ratings and informal decision-making processes often disadvantage African stakeholders. Representation in key bodies like the Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) is proportionally strong. Still, it lacks significant impact due to limited integration into influential sub-groups and uncertainty about advocating regional agendas.

Participation yields notable benefits for African CSOs. It fosters knowledge sharing, strengthens advocacy efforts, and enhances networking opportunities. Many respondents highlighted how IGF participation informed their policy initiatives and advocacy strategies at national and regional levels. For instance, Ethiopia’s AI policy framework and data protection proclamation were influenced by hosting the IGF in 2022. Additionally, youth initiatives have empowered young leaders to contribute meaningfully to Internet governance discussions.

However, challenges like high costs, complex workshop proposal processes, and competing priorities limit broader engagement. The lack of action plans for follow-up activities also hampers sustained impact at regional levels.

To address these issues and enhance African civil society’s role in the IGF ecosystem, several recommendations emerge. They have been clustered into four categories:

  1. Recommendations related to the IGF’s institutional infrastructure and outreach
  2. Recommendations regarding the IGF’s format and content
  3. Recommendations for strengthened and more coordinated African civil society participation in IGF processes
  4. Recommendation on avoiding duplication, and strengthening the multistakeholder approach, the IGF, and other related existing initiatives

These recommendations could also be clustered according to whom they are addressed. Some are specifically for the consideration of those directly responsible for organising the global and regional IGFs – the institutions, secretariats and multistakeholder advisory groups. Some are intended for consideration by civil society networks and organisations that play a role in facilitating – regionally, globally, or nationally – capacity development and/or advocacy and participation in internet-related policy processes. Some recommendations are for the consideration of the CADE project and its implementing partners. All the recommendations would benefit from review and validation by African civil society organisations themselves; the people and institutions who have been actively supporting and participating in the IGF ecosystem, despite facing multiple barriers. That is why there is an overarching recommendation to the CADE partners to convene an online consultation during which these recommendations could be presented to, and reviewed by, African civil society involved in internet governance.

It is also important to consider two emerging risks to strengthened African civil society participation in the IGF ecosystem. Ironically, one risk has emerged from within the United Nations system itself. The Global Digital Compact (GDC), an annex to the 2024 Pact for the Future, the primary output document of the UN General Assembly’s Summit for the Future held in September 2024, includes principles and objectives that add helpful contemporary insights to the existing framing of digitilisation, development and human rights provided by the World Summit of the Information Society process from which the IGF emerged. This process, led by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), has been complemented and grounded by subsequent work done by the Human Rights Council and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Civil society in Africa has only recently been able to consistently participate and follow these processes; to a large extent as a result of the galvanising role played by the IGF ecosystem which is the ultimate “melting pot” for the range of issues involved.  As of January 1, 2025, the Office of the Secretary-General’s Envoy on Technology (OSET) has been restructured and renamed the United Nations Office for Digital and Emerging Technologies (ODET). This change follows the adoption of the GDC by the UN General Assembly. If it results in creating a new nexus of coordination and engagement with member states that duplicate existing Geneva and Paris-based processes, and that is based in New York at UN headquarters, it could amplify the challenges faced by African civil society wanting to participate in these processes. 

The second risk is IGF-specific. There is a tendency to take the stability and continuity of civil society participation in the IGF for granted because, at first glance, participation statistics always reflect civil society as the largest (in terms of number of individual participants) stakeholder group present at the annual event. This is a very dangerous assumption. Firstly, factors such as the choice of host country and play a role. Civil society participation at the 2024 IGF dropped to 12% from 24% in 2023 as many civil society organisations, even if they support the IGF,  were concerned about traveling to and showing support for, a country where they felt digital rights are not respected. Secondly, a large percentage masks internal diversity. It is difficult to establish just how many civil society participants are from the global South, vs. the number from the global North, and, in general, civil society is the largest stakeholder group because it represents the largest and most diverse range of public and community interests and concerns. Dismissing the IGF as a space dominated by civil society is both inaccurate and short-sighted. This case study helps debunk some of these assumptions.

In conclusion, African civil society has made significant strides within the IGF ecosystem. However, addressing systemic barriers and fostering inclusivity is essential for maximizing the impact of their participation, nationally, regionally, and most of all at the global level.  Without doing so they are unlikely to transition from being passengers and fellow travelers, to being active drivers of Internet governance processes at home and further afield.

1.  Background on CADE and this case study

Civil Society Alliance for Digital Empowerment (CADE) is a collaborative project that aims to bring about a lasting increase in structural civil society participation in global internet processes. The Diplo Foundation leads the CADE consortium of nine organisations one of which is KictaNet. The four-year project seeks to strengthen the ability of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to advocate effectively in multilateral and multistakeholder Internet Governance (IG) processes. It is co-funded by the European Union and was officially launched at the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS)+20 Forum High-Level Event 2024, in Geneva, Switzerland.

1.1 Purpose of the case study

The purpose of this case study is to examine the current state of African civil society engagement in the Internet Governance Forum ecosystem. This “ecosystem” consists of the annual global IGF and IGF “intersessional” activities which consist of several Best Practice Forums (BPFs), Policy Networks (PNs), Dynamic Coalitions (DCs) and Youth IGF initiatives. There are also “tracks” for members of parliament, the judiciary and business (the latter two are still under development). Within Africa it consists of national, sub-regional and regional IGFs, Youth IGFs and some linked schools of Internet Governance. Many national and regional IGF initiatives exist around the world but this study will focus on the African context.

The learnings this case study aims to surface include:

  • The scale and scope of African CS participation in all the different parts of the IGF ecosystem that are mentioned above. This will include the ‘character’ or tone of this participation – e.g. do African CSOs lonely focus on regional and local issues, or are they active in topics of global concern
  • Opportunities/factors that have enabled participation
  • Barriers/factors that have made participation difficult
  • Outcomes/benefits from this participation including whether/how it leads to spin-off activities or impact, networking and partnership building, including strengthening multistakeholder relationships/civil society networking or movement building
  • Perceptions among African CSOs of the longer-term influence or impact resulting from this participation at the local/national level, but also at the regional and global level
  • Perceptions/suggestions of how African CSO participation in the IGF ecosystem can be strengthened and made more sustainable and impactful.
  • Unintended consequences

1.2  Methodology

Information was gathered through desk research including a review of previous literature on African civil society participation in the IGF, an online survey, and interviews with key informants. The latter included organisers of national, regional, or subregional IGFs, MAG members, the secretariat of the global and the African IGF, and staff from other IG institutions e.g. ICANN and ISOC1.

Literature review

A brief overview of available material on African civil society participation in the IGF ecosystem was done. Sources that were of particular value for this case study include:

  • Beyond multistakeholder tokenism: A provisional examination of participation in the IGF (2021) by Anri van der Spuy and Pablo Aguera of Research ICT Africa. It examines trends in participation in the IGF and IGF intersessional activities from 2006 to 2020. It concludes that overall, participation in the annual event increased steadily and that it became more diverse over time, but it was still not “very diverse”. The location of an annual IGF impacts the geographic diversity of participation. Participation in inter-sessional activities, on the other hand, has decreased over time, even if the outputs produced by the BPFs and PNs are considered very valuable.
  • IGF Dynamic Coalitions: Digital cooperation in practice (2021): A report commissioned by the MAG chair in 2021 developed by the IGF Secretariat working with the Dynamic Coalition coordinator. It provides a detailed overview of the history, impact and challenges of DCs. This report revealed that DCs do work and achieve concrete outcomes. The level of engagement and outputs varies enormously and depends on the investment in time and resources of the facilitators and key participants. 
  • The Internet Governance Forum: Lasting legacy of the WGIG (2015). This is a chapter in a volume published by ICANN and the Association for Progressive Communications to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Working Group on Internet Governance. It looks at the IGF in particular and its value for civil society and argues that the IGF can be seen as the legacy of an innovative approach to dealing with the lack of consensus between member states on how the Internet should be governed that remained at the end of the first phase of the World Summit on the Information Society. Putting the challenges to a diverse, multistakeholder group of people and institutions created the space for them to come up with the idea of having a forum focused on dialogue and engagement, the  IGF. It demonstrates that if the process is fit for purpose it can produce sustainable results.
  • NET EFFECTS: an evidence-led exploration of IGF impact (2024). Carolina Caeiro, Dorottya Zsiboracs, Peter Job, Kieren McCarthy, Georgia Osborn, Emily Taylor, and Chris Buckridge.  April 2024. This study was completed in early 2024 and is the most comprehensive publicly available evaluation of the IGF done to date. It found that the IGF has had lasting and significant direct and indirect influence on the development of the Internet and Internet-related regulations, policies and laws.  In the context of the 2024 Global Digital Compact and efforts to locate more UN-based digital cooperation activity at United Nations Headquarters in New York, the study found that the IGF acts as a “crucial connection point for policymakers, business, technologists, activists and academics for both existing and emerging issues within the Internet governance and digital governance worlds”. Over time the IGF has become the centre of not just Internet governance dialogue, but of an international ecosystem that includes Regional and National IGFs that both “feed up and pull down” from the annual global meeting. “Global discussions are turned into local actions, and those local actions are then used as real-world examples at the global level.”  Looking at both direct and indirect impacts of the IGF they conclude also that the IGF has given voice and a hearing to individuals and groups that would otherwise have struggled to have their concerns or perspectives heard. One of the examples cited is the increase in Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) in Africa.
  • Stronger digital voices from Africa: Building African digital foreign policy and diplomacy (2022). Diplo Foundation, November 2022.  This study is focused on the extent to which African governments articulate positions and influence in digital foreign policy and diplomacy rather than on the IGF specifically or the role of civil society. Nevertheless, it provides a very valuable background.
  • The IGF website has a wealth of statistics and information and the IGF Secretariat provided additional information. Some of the information online, such as lists of high-level speakers, is not available in the same format every year, which makes analysis difficult.  Also, the IGF participation statistics are broken down by either region or stakeholder group, not by stakeholder group within each region. It is not impossible to get this data, but it is not readily available.

Survey and interviews

The 22 responses to the survey came from individuals based in 11 African countries and interviews were conducted with nine individuals from eight countries, six of which are in Africa. The survey was only made available in English. 

CountrySurvey responsesInterviews
Cameroon5
Chad1
Ethiopia12
Gambia1
Ghana2
Kenya21
Malawi1
Nigeria41
South Africa31
Uganda11
Zambia1
Netherlands1
Switzerland1
Zimbabwe1
Total number229

2. The IGF ecosystem

The Internet Governance Forum (IGF) emerged from the World Summit on the Information’s second phase which culminated in a Summit held in Tunis in November 2005. Initially conceived as only an annual event, it soon started to evolve organically to better fulfill its mandate as outlined in the Tunis Agenda, the outcome document of the final phase of the WSIS. A brief overview of this ecosystem is included in this section.. Findings on African civil society participation follow in section 3.

2.1 The annual IGF global event

The first IGF took place in Athens in 2006 and the 19th will take place in Riyadh in December 2024. The IGF has been convened in Africa three times: the 4th IGF in 2009   hosted by the government of Egypt in Sharm El Sheikh; the 6th IGF in 2011, hosted by the government of Kenya in Nairobi, and the 17th IGF in 2022 hosted by the government of Ethiopia in Addis Ababa. In many respects, the annual event remains at the heart of the IGF ecosystem. To make it more inclusive the Secretariat, the Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) and the host country have tried to facilitate “remote participation” for the many people unable to attend in person. Until COVID 19 these efforts had mixed success. But, after convening, successfully, a fully virtual IGF in 2020 and a hybrid IGF in 2021 the IGF has become fully hybrid, enabling online and offline participants and speakers.

Convening a hybrid event remains challenging. Even when it works, the quality and character of online participation are very different from being onsite. The impact this has had on African civil society participation is discussed below.

IGF format and content

The annual IGF started with static themes, repeated every year, one “main session” per theme, opening and closing sessions, workshops, and an exhibition area, known as the IGF village. This has evolved into a much more complex event running over five days (including Day 0) consisting of different types of sessions.

  • Main sessions – organised by the MAG
  • High-level sessions – organised by the host country and the Secretariat. This practice was first introduced during the Kenya IGF in 2011
  • Workshops
  • Open forums
  • Launches and awards
  • Lightning talks
  • Networking sessions
  • Dynamic Coalition sessions
  • National and Regional IGF sessions
  • Day 0 events
  • Capacity building sessions

IGF outputs have also evolved. Initially, a summary of the proceedings was published in book form. Later only a ‘chair’s’ summary was compiled by the host country chair. Some host countries produced their version of an “IGF report”, not formally endorsed by the UN. In 2017 then host, the Swiss government, introduced “IGF messages”. Organisers of sessions compile their reports which are available on the IGF website. Some of the other intersessional modalities, described below, produce their outputs and publications. 

In other words, even if the IGF is not a decision-making forum, it is a forum that facilitates debate and dialogue and that produces outputs, some of which, if they find their way to the right place at the right time, can be influential.

2.2 The IGF’s institutional architecture

The IGF Secretariat2

The Secretariat is part of the United Nations Division for Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA). It has a small staff based in Geneva, working closely with colleagues in DESA in New York. The Secretariat is responsible for the overall running of the IGF, including the website, support for intersessional work, collaboration with the host country and operational aspects of the annual event. 

The IGF Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG)3

The MAG develops programme content and themes and does workshop proposal selection. The MAG is a group of 40 to 50 (currently 40)  individuals appointed for, usually, three-year terms, by the UN Secretary General, the IGF MAG. MAG members are all voluntary. There are MAG working groups that can include individuals who are not part of the MAG but who wish to support its work. Representatives from international organisations and past host country governments are entitled to participate in MAG meetings and collaborate freely with the appointed MAG members.

The IGF Leadership Panel (LP)4

The Leadership Panel, first appointed in 2022, is a small group of high-profile individuals who have some degree of prominence in their sectors. Their goal is to promote the IGF and its outcomes and support IGF fundraising.

2.3 IGF “Inter-sessional” work

“Inter-sessional” refers to activity that takes place in between annual IGF “sessions”. In other words, in between the various annual forums. Only those intersessional forums that are open to civil society are discussed below. Others, such as the Parliamentary and Judiciary Tracks prioritise other stakeholder groups.

Dynamic Coalitions (DCs)5

Proposed at the inaugural annual IGF held in Athens in 2006, DCs were the first intersessional innovation. The goal of these coalitions was to continue discussions on certain Internet governance (IG) issues in the time between IGF annual meetings. DCs are open to anyone interested in the topics they address. The IGF provides some basic guidelines and criteria. Currently there are 31 active Dynamic Coalitions.

National and Regional IGFs (NRIs)6 

NRIs first emerged in 2008 followed a few years later by sub-regional and national IGFs. The first regional IGF was the East African IGF held in 2008, organised primarily by KictaNet. It included participants from the five member countries of the East African Community: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda7. Soon other regions followed, Europe and Latin America being the first. These regional IGFs proved so popular that people started organising country-specific “national” IGFs. According to the IGF website, at the beginning of 2024, there were 110 national IGF initiatives around the world, with 36 of these in Africa. Overall there are more than 155 NRIs around the world. 

Best Practice Forums (BPFs)8

BPFs were introduced in 2014 in response to the recommendations of the CSTD Working Group on Improvements to the IGF9. They offer substantive ways for the IGF to produce more concrete outcomes that can inform policy debates on specific topics that take place beyond the IGF itself.

Policy Networks10 

Like BPFs, Policy Networks, first introduced in 2021, aim to meet the broader mandate of the IGF as outlined in the Tunis Agenda. It was an innovation that was spurred on by the United Nations Secretary-General’s Roadmap for Digital Cooperation ‎which envisaged an IGF strengthened to better integrate policy development work related to digital cooperation11. Their goal is to convene experts and practitioners to collaboratively formulate policy recommendations on specific issues such as the internet and the environment, meaningful access, and artificial intelligence.

Youth Initiatives12 and the IGF Youth Track

The IGF’s youth strategy includes capacity building, an annual Youth Track (since 2022), and Youth IGF Initiatives which are organised by young people around the world either as independent national and regional events or as pre-events linked to NRIs. The goal of the IGF’s youth initiatives is to create a space within the IGF for those young people already interested in IG while at the same time serving to attract more young people to take an interest in substantive discussion on Internet governance. In addition to the African Youth IGF initiative and the West African Youth IGF there are seven national youth IGF initiatives in Africa in Benin, Burundi, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo,  Ghana, Mauritius and Nigeria13.

The Youth Track is part of the annual programme of the IGF and consists of events and activities throughout the year, some online, and some linked to regional IGFs and the global IGF. In 2024 the theme of this track is “Empowering young leaders for trusted AI”14.

3. Findings

3.1 The scale and scope of African CS participation in the IGF ecosystem

Participation in the global event

African and civil society participation as percentages of overall participation

The location of an IGF host country impacts significantly on African participation. So does the relative difficulty in getting visas. In 2022 when the IGF was hosted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 44% of participants were from the African region15. In 2023 when Japan hosted, African participation was only 8%16. The percentages below for African participation are not broken down by stakeholder group, however, as civil society is generally the largest single stakeholder group at the IGF, it can be assumed that this is also true for participants from Africa. 

YearHost country and cityPercentage of onsite participants by region (only three regions included for comparison purposes) sourced from the IGF websitePercentage of onsite participants from civil society except for 2020 when all participation was virtual
AfricaAsia PacificWEOG17From all regions
201918Berlin, Germany10125542
202019Virtual IGF15173539
202120Katowice, Poland19132335
202221Addis Ababa, Ethiopia44152132
202322Kyoto, Japan8572024

Overall, the percentage of African participation in the global event is smaller than that from WEOG or from the Asia Pacific region. As already stated, 2022 stands out as the IGF was hosted in Africa which made it simpler and cheaper for African participants. African participation was also relatively high in 2021 because, as a result of COVID-19, many Europeans and North Americans people were not travelling. Covid had relatively less impact in Africa and more Africans were willing to travel. The host country, Poland, also worked very hard to facilitate travel funding and visas. In comparison, in 2019 when the IGF was hosted in Germany pre-Covid, only 10% of participants were from Africa.

The chart below, produced by the DNS Foundation in their impact study of the IGF compares participation by region from 2016 to 2023 and also illustrates how the location of the host country correlates with regional participation23. 

IGF format and content

The IGF MAG identifies an overarching theme and subthemes every year. This is done in response to a call for input from the IGF community but is also influenced by current dates in the digital environment, UN processes, and host country priorities. Every year tends to have a different number of themes. The table below reflects IGF themes from 2019 to 2024. Only the sub-themes are listed as these relate more directly to the workshop and main session content than the overarching theme.

IGF themes and subthemes by year

While many respondents to the survey felt that African civil society has not been that influential in shaping the IGF’s agenda, the annual themes have mostly included the concerns it is usually most closely identified with: digital inclusion and digital rights.


Year		                                                                                    Themes
12345678 
2019Data governance Digital inclusionSecurity, safety, stability and resiliencen/an/an/an/an/a
2020DataEnvironmentInclusionTrustn/an/an/an/a
2021Economic and social inclusion and human rightsUniversal access and meaningful connectivityEmerging regulationEnviron-mental sustain-ability and climate changeInclusive Internet governance ecosystems and digital cooperationTrust, security, stabilityn/an/a
2022Connecting all people and safeguard-ing human rightsAvoiding internet fragmenta-tionGoverning data and protecting privacyEnabling safety, security and account-abilityAddressing advanced technologies, including AIn/an/an/a
2023AI and emerging tech-nologies  Avoiding Internet fragmen-tation  Cyber-security cyber-crime, and online safetyData gover-nance and  trustDigital divides and inclusion Global digital gover-nance and coopera-tion Human rights and freedomSustain-ability and environment 
2024Harnessing innovation and balancing risks in the digital spaceEnhancing the digital contribution to peace, develop-ment, and sustain-ability Advancing human rights and inclusion in the digital ageImproving digital gover-nance for the Internet We Wantn/an/an/an/a

When it comes to IGF content, there is a discrepancy between intention and outcome. The MAG and the Secretariat feel that they prioritise global South concerns. However, most people interviewed and surveyed feel that during the actual event, the debate is generally dominated by global North voices. Looking at the above distribution of themes by year, it can be argued that the structure of the IGF which is essentially global and multistakeholder simply does not enable effective prioritisation of their concerns for African stakeholders – even if the themes seem relevant. 

Session proposals by year and by region

Looking at the distribution of session proposals submitted in 2022 and 2024 it is clear that having the IGF hosted in Africa served to encourage a significantly larger number of proposals from the region. Interviews with IGF Secretariat personnel revealed that in general most proposals emanate from the Western Europe and Other group, with 2022 serving as an exception.


Year
Host country and city		Percentage of session proposals received by region (only three regions included for comparison purposes) sourced from the IGF websitePercentage of proposals received from civil society from all regionsFrom all regions
AfricaAsia PacificWEOG24Eastern EuropeGRULAC25IGOs
202226Addis Ababa, Ethiopia261825719561
202327Kyoto, Japan16.223.629.86.116.3853.5

High-level track speakers

Data on African speakers at main sessions and in the high-level track is not easily available for all years. For the last few years however, (2021 onwards) speakers at the high-level sessions are profiled on the IGF site but the data for 2021 contains a large number of duplicates. Not surprisingly 2022 stands out as a good year for African speakers, in general, but not for African speakers from civil society28. 

YearHost country and cityTotal number of listed high-level speakers 1Speakers from Africa (African civil society speakers}
2022Ethiopia, Addis Ababa582923 (2 from CS)
2023 Kyoto Japan313 (none from CS)

Participation in the IGF’s institutional architecture

Secretariat

The current coordinator of the IGF Secretariat is Zimbabwean. He has been part of the IGF’s secretariat since its inception and is the only longer-term member of the team from Africa. Since 2006, the IGF has hosted eight fellows from Africa, a significant percentage out of a total of 21 fellows worldwide. One of these continued to work with the Secretariat as a consultant. One other short-term consultant also came from Africa30. If one considers that the IGF has contracted around 20 consultants over the last 20 years, having only 2 from Africa is cause for concern.

MAG

Since its establishment in 2006 out of a total of 324 MAG members 66 have been from Africa.31 Of these, 16 were from African civil society organisations. This compares well with civil society participation from other parts of the world. However, several respondents felt that these MAG members did not have a significant impact on shaping the agenda of the IGF. Reasons given included the tendency for MAG members to work in “caucuses” or cliques. African MAG members are mostly not included in these informal sub-groups. Another reason given was that it was not clear to MAG members from Africa whether it was appropriate for them to push a “regional” agenda when planning a global event.

From the perspective of the IGF secretariat MAG members from Africa are, by and large, active members. There are exceptions but most have made a significant contribution.  “…the majority of African MAG members have made significant contributions to the group’s work. They are actively involved in MAG meetings and have taken on leadership roles as facilitators in various working groups and intersessional work streams. Notably, many African members continue to contribute to the IGF’s efforts even after their formal term in the MAG ends. This shows a deep and sustained commitment to the forum’s objectives from the African region.”

The Secretariat also feels that inputs from the IGF community consistently highlight African priorities already, which means that MAG members from Africa can build on that. 

However, once MAG members do workshop selection the ratings are done anonymously and because overall participation from Africa is generally not that strong, topics of relevance to African stakeholders could be sidelined. Respondents attribute this to the fact that the governmental representatives from Africa tend to be either absent or not particularly active.

Participation in the intersessional work

National and regional IGFs

These regional IGFs proved so popular that people started organising country-specific national IGFs. According to IGF Secretariat statistics at the beginning of 2024, there were more than 155 NRIs around the world with 36 in Africa. Even accounting for the fact that Africa has more countries than other regions, this is an impressive number. While these are multistakeholder events civil society organisations play a leading role in convening most NRIs in Africa. Even the regional African IGF which has a secretariat that has rotated between the UN Economic Commission for Africa and the African Union Commission (currently it is located in UNECA) and it is generally hosted by a host country governmental authority or department relies on civil society participation and the current chair of the African IGF MAG is from civil society.

Table 1: National and Regional IGFs by region32

RegionNationalRegional and sub-regional
Africa367
Asia Pacific166
Eastern Europe171
GRULAC (Latin American Group)213
WEOG (Western Europe and Other Group)173
Total10720

Policy Networks, Best Practice Forums and Dynamic Coalitions

Of the 22 survey respondents, 11 had participated in PNs, BPFs or DCs. Only one indicated that they participated ery actively and, as a result, gained much benefit.  In its retrospective assessment of the impact of DCs, the Secretariat cites the DC on Internet Rights and Principles as an example of a DC in which an African civil society initiative, the African Declaration on Internet Rights and Principles, featured prominently. African digital rights organisations also participated fairly actively in this DC and its events at the IGF.33

Two policy networks were co-proposed and facilitated by African members of the MAG. The first was the PN on Meaningful Access, in 2021 and the second was the PN on Artificial Intelligence in 2022. However, in both these cases the individuals involved were from the private sector, not from civil society. There has been some participation from African civil society in the PN on Meaningful Access but very little in the case of the PN on AI, or on Internet Fragmentation. 

Youth IGF initiatives

IGF youth initiatives and the IGF Youth Track as it is currently referred to stands out, along with NRIs, as an IGF inter-sessional activity where African participants in general, and those from civil society in particular, shine. Not only do they participate actively, they provide leadership. For example, among the 35 organisers of the 2024 IGF Youth Track 13 are from Africa; significantly more than from any other region.34

Respondents to the survey and interview confirmed that its youth initiatives are the element of the IGF ecosystem in which African participation is the strongest. And that includes African civil society participants. However, it also includes young people from the technical community and the effectiveness of African youth in the IGF can, at least in part, if not to a great extent, be attributed to efforts from the technical community.

One respondent expressed concern that within the IGF Youth Track information and opportunities are given to the same people but the vast majority of respondents who had been part of IGF youth initiatives found it very rewarding.

3.2 Opportunities/factors that have enabled participation

The “bottom-up” process

The IGF’s bottom-up process is probably one of the most fundamental mechanisms that enables participation of African civil society. Any organisation or individual can submit a workshop proposal. However, many respondents mentioned that they feel the selection process has become so “strict” that it is a barrier, rather than an enabler.

The shift to hybrid

As a result of COVID 19 the IGF has, since 2020, become a hybrid event rather than a face-to-face event with some remote participation. This is challenging and resource-intensive but it has enabled far greater participation from African civil society. Even if online participation offers fewer benefits than being onsite does, it is still a way for people to follow debates and build knowledge.

Co-facilitation of intersessional work

Respondents who participated actively in intersessional work reported that they benefited substantially. There is a clear correlation between how active individuals participated, and the benefit they gained. People who follow PNs, BPFs and DCs passively did not feel that they gained much. In other words, just subscribing to a list is not sufficient.

The IGF travel fund35

Every year the IGF Secretariat and the host country make financial support for travel to the global IGF, and sometimes to some of the regional IGFs, available through an open application process. The amount available varies from year to year, and depends to a large degree on the resources made available by the host country of that year’s IGF. 

The fund is open to applications from individuals from any stakeholder group, but they need to meet the following criteria:  

  • Be from a Least Developed Country, Landlocked Developing Country, Small Island Developing State or Economy in Transition;
  • Be engaged in the IGF process  for that year as active contributors in the intersessional and ‎NRIs or as session co-organizers, session speakers, moderators and rapporteurs;
  • Demonstrate interest in Internet governance-related activities;
  • Show a demonstrated commitment to contributing to their community after ‎participating at the IGF;‎
  • Be recommended by a respected IGF community member.‎

The selection process may give preference to under-represented groups, such as: ‎women, indigenous people, persons with disabilities, and youth.

There is widespread recognition that this fund needs to be increased, But, while data is not available on how much support has been given to individuals from African civil society specifically, there is evidence that this fund has made it possible for multiple African civil society members of the MAG, and role players in the IGF youth and NRI processes to participate in the annual forum. Over time, this fund has made a significant contribution to financing the presence of African civil society at the IGF. 

Partnerships with global networks or organisations

Most survey respondents felt that global networks and organisations play a positive role in enabling African civil society’s participation in the IGF. Four respondents were not sure, and only one felt that these global organisations or networks were not making a positive contribution to African civil society’s participation.  In the in-depth interviews it emerged that while funding and facilitation of participation provided by global networks are very much appreciated, it does generally coincide with the African civil society participants having to participate in the IGF activities being organised or prioritised by these global networks. These priorities do not always coincide with the regional or national priorities of the participating African civil society organisations.

Prior participation in national and regional IGFs

Of the 22 survey respondents, 20 felt that first participating in National or Regional IGF Initiatives enables more effective African civil society participation in the global IGF. One was not sure and one said it did not make any difference. Interviewees elaborated on this, affirming the learning and confidence-building gained at national and regional IGFs. However, they also pointed out that the linkages between these events and the global events are not adequately optimised. 

3.3 Benefits and longer-term outcomes and impact

There is no doubt that African civil society believes that there is value in participating in the IGF ecosystem. Some might have concerns about the sustainability of regional and national IGFs, or the lack of influence that Africa has in the global IGF, but the vast majority of respondents emphasised the value of the IGF process.

“While there is no outcome document from the global IGF that can be used for policy advocacy at national or regional levels, the ideas and knowledge acquired from the global IGF can inform policy initiatives at national or regional levels and can enable civil society actors [to] make more informed and sound input into policy processes at national and regional levels or even enable them to initiate such processes. It is the bedrock to multistakeholderism.”


Some of the benefits and impacts highlighted are summarised below.

Gaining and sharing knowledge 

Most respondents highlighted this as a primary benefit of participating in the IGF ecosystem. Some specified that the knowledge gained aids decision-building on Internet governance in the African region. Many added that the IGF does not just provide an opportunity to learn, it gives them a platform to share what they know with others. Others pointed out how it was through the IGF that they gained access to opportunities for capacity building through training programmes and fellowships.

Strengthened advocacy and access to governments

Respondents who participated in intersessional processes feel that the resulting learning and outcome reports were useful in their day-to-day advocacy.  One said that participating in the Policy Network on Internet Fragmentation provided them with the opportunity of understanding the concept and helped them to upskill their organisation’s related advocacy efforts. Several highlighted how the global IGF and NRIs have encouraged African civil society to work with their governments nationally and vice versa, as well as with sub-regional and regional bodies like Regional Economic Communities and the African Union.

Personal and organisational growth

One respondent said that as a result of the IGF they have taken up further study in cyber security. Another emphasised personal and organisational growth:

“My participation in all IGF spaces has been quite valuable for my personal growth and that of my organisation. It has been a space to learn about the IG issues and conversations happening at different levels, history and strategies being put in place to deal with them. I am aware of the actors and been able to establish networks for collaborations with different multistakeholders, thanks to IGF spaces.”

Another pointed to recognition and credibility that can be gained from participation:

“Being part of the global or regional ecosystem is very helpful to build confidence and credibility while working locally. It also gives recognition from peers.”

Cross-regional insights

The opportunity to share experiences, challenges and possible solutions with people from other regions stands out as a key benefit in multiple responses. 

Partnership and networking building

Partnership and collaboration are seen as one of the greatest benefits of participating in the IGF ecosystem. People who already have a topic or an area of policy advocacy that they prioritise appear to benefit more from the IGF than those with a generalised interest in internet governance. Those working on local internet access felt that they were able to use the IGF as a platform for getting their message across as well as building new partnerships. What is particularly important is that people see the IGF as opening doors that otherwise would not have been opened:

“The IGF opens the door to networks and opportunities that we would otherwise not have access to.”

“Networking begets knowledge sharing both formally and informally which invariably benefits the sector.”

Some also highlighted that the IGF is an opportunity to showcase work in the region which can lead to securing partners and funding.

Global to local impact and building regional and national agendas through NRIs in Africa

The African IGF and subregional, as well as national IGFs, have helped build an understanding of the African Union’s digital transformation strategy and data policy framework among civil society organisations. Respondents pointed out that if they had not been to AfriSIG or the African IGF they would not have known about this policy as the AU itself did not engage civil society sufficiently when developing it. Several respondents observed that their participation in the global IGF and intersessional work helped them improve national and regional IGFs. One cited a very specific example of the IGF’s longer-term impact:

“An example is the AI policy framework recently developed by Ethiopia, along with the data protection proclamation. This can be taken as the result of the IGF being held in Ethiopia in 2022.”

3.4 Barriers

Cost – the primary barrier

Survey respondents identified cost as by far the most significant barrier. A smaller number identified a lack of knowledge of “where to start” and how to become involved as a significant barrier. It is important to note that only 5% considered lack of knowledge of internet governance to be an important barrier.

Difficulty of workshop proposal process

Two interviewees highlighted the difficulty in submitting successful workshop proposals as a barrier. The consequence of being unsuccessful is that without having an active speaking or organising role at the global IGF it is very difficult for individuals in African civil society organisations to secure or justify funding for their participation. 

In recent years the MAG has introduced more stringent criteria for workshop selection. In spite of the MAG’s best efforts, most people still seem to be somewhat mystified about how selection is made. Many feel unfairly discriminated against and some feel that it is not even worth trying to submit a proposal. 

Lack of time and competing interests

A respondent who participated in a PN and a BPF and who was a speaker at two IGFs (2014 and 2023) said that there were just too many competing interests and that balancing work with volunteering on the different processes makes it challenging to participate effectively.

The lack of “action plans”

One person felt that the lack of action plans affects regional participation negatively as there is no channel for focused follow-up.

Digital exclusion fatigue

As much as there is widespread concern with Africa’s primary challenge, digital exclusion, there already seems to be a sense of fatigue felt mostly by people who do have access and for whom the fact that millions in Africa do not is largely an abstract concept. There is also a sense that the same conversation is being repeated, with policymakers, regulators, and operators all saying they are doing their best. Finding more impactful and innovative ways of addressing digital exclusion should be prioritised by the IGF MAG and by African civil society participants in the IGF process.

Over-reliance on NRIs

Some respondents felt that the NRIs should not be seen as the primary means of building regional participation. One expressed concern that when trying to include African voices and priorities the global IGF secretariat deals only with the focal points of the national IGFs in Africa. This respondent pointed out that many national NRIs are either dominated by the government or the technical community and in the case of authoritarian regimes, civil society organisations do not feel they can participate openly. 

3.5 Value that African CS participation adds to the IGF ecosystem

Most respondents believed that African civil society’s participation adds substantial value to the IGF. Examples cited include: 

  • Having African CS in the IGF ecosystem creates opportunities for governments in Africa to learn from them and work with them, globally and at the national level.
  • It helps other regions of the world to understand the position and perspectives of the African region. “Many people from the global North at the IGF have never been to Africa. By sharing African CS views on issues such as digital rights, how to tackle gender issues, environmental sustainability and social justice it builds partnerships and solidarity.” 
  • African CS participation helps donors and governments who invest in Africa gain knowledge that enables them to design their programmes more effectively. “Coloring global vision with African perspectives is a must. It is also important to express clarity on “Internet Rights in Africa” with all its political, cultural, infrastructural and socio-economic specificities.”
  • Bringing the African perspective to a conversation that happens at the global level makes IGF engagement more robust, and more meaningful. 
  • In formulating or advancing policy frameworks that are truly global and take into account various contexts, the global IGF community benefits from having a better understanding of the realities, contexts and priorities of the African region as a result of the participation of African civil society organizations. 
  • It makes the dialogue on the internet ecosystem inclusive, considering that Africa is a huge community in the digital space.
  • African CSOs often present innovative grassroots approaches to global IG discussions.

4. Conclusions

The IGF does not work well as a spectator sport

It was evident from the survey responses and interviews that those who invest time in intersessional work or participate in IGF sessions gain the most value from the process:

“My involvement in the regional IGFs and various intersessional activities has been immensely enriching. Since last year, my participation in the PNAI [Policy Network on Artificial Intelligence] and the PNMA [Policy Network on Meaningful Access], along with the annual policy briefs, has deepened my understanding of the past, present context and enabled me to offer insights and recommendations for the future. Serving as a Steering Committee member for the African region in the Youth Coalition on Internet Governance (YCIG), Dynamic Coalition, has been particularly rewarding, as it has allowed me to facilitate the involvement of young people in the IGF and shaping the IGF.”

What is needed for someone to get to this point of enhanced participation? Factors that stand out include facilitation and support from the IGF Secretariat and the bottom-up process of shaping the agenda and submitting session proposals which builds ownership. As the IGF ecosystem evolves it needs to take great care to retain this characteristic. It is already at risk with trends in how the MAG is selecting workshop proposals. 

As important as retaining “bottom-up” ownership is clarifying outcomes and follow-up. Some participants are comfortable with follow-up and action plans emerging organically. Others seem to expect more deliberate processes whereby discussion and agreement reached at the IGF find their way into the regional space. Even when there is some thematic coherence between the regional African IGF and the global IGF most people do not seem aware of this, or of how it is intended to be operationalised.  Very few people seem aware of the “IGF messages” and how they can be used to inform policy-making.  

Some African civil society stakeholders appear to expect that following up on a global or regional IGF is the responsibility of the United Nations itself, or the African Union, or of governments.

Clarifying what “follow-up”  means in the context of a forum for dialogue and debate such as the IGF can help debunk this notion. So can clearer linkages between proposals and ideas for follow-up and the IGF’s intersessional forums and a more deliberate focus on the annual “IGF messages” – ideas and proposals that are generated based on the deliberations during the annual event.

Equally important is a more deliberate and coordinated engagement by African civil society in the IGF ecosystem. This does not have to be the only way in which they engage – its openness is one of the IGF’s strengths. However, if African civil society organisations want to use the IGF to promote specific advocacy agendas, globally, regionally, and nationally, they need to engage in the ecosystem in a more structured and organised manner. Suggestions on how to do this are included in the recommendations below.

There is a tendency to underestimate the complexity of multistakeholder collaboration in Internet governance

While civil society is the largest group among participants in the global IGF this is not always the case at regional and national levels. Many NRIs are led by the technical community or by government or intergovernmental organisations. In other cases, the government is reluctant to participate. 

Contexts vary, but what is consistent is that effective multistakeholder participation in the IGF ecosystem is never easy. This is particularly the case in contexts where there are human rights and digital inclusion concerns which civil society believes governments and companies should be held accountable for.

5. Recommendations

5.1 Recommendations related to the IGF’s institutional infrastructure and outreach

The Secretariat

The Secretariat should make a substantial effort to include African concerns and participants in the IGF process. Further, it would benefit from having a greater African presence in the team. Such individuals should have a background in working closely with or inside African civil society. As one respondent put it:

“There should be [a] balance of power in leadership positions of [the] IGF secretariat to capture Africa’s interest.”

What is working well in the Secretariat is the dedicated attention given to some of the intersessional modalities and the notable sensitivity to African participation. This stands out in the case of NRIs and the Youth Track.

The MAG

The MAG’s terms of reference is easily found on the IGF website, yet, many people are not clear on precisely what they are from a ‘regional’ perspective as MAG members serve in their personal capacity, but are expected to have established linkages with their respective stakeholder groups. Their primary role is to advise the Secretary-General on the programme and schedule of the Internet Governance Forum meetings. They are expected to “Engage in outreach communication to the wider community and bring other networks related to Internet governance into the MAG discussions and planning”. But there is no specific mention of their role concerning their region of origin.36 

It is recommended that the terms of reference clarify what MAG members’ responsibilities are concerning their region and stakeholder group. The MAG chair could also be more explicit in, from time to time, seeking comments and input by region. Some MAG chairs have done this with positive results at the level of increasing coordinated participation of MAG members from the global South.

It is also recommended that African civil society participates actively in MAG Working Groups, particularly the MAG Working Group on IGF Strategy. This group, which is open to all, crafts strategic responses to processes that impact the IGF, such as the WSIS review and the Global Digital Compact.37

The Leadership Panel

The Leadership Panel should engage in regional consultations with specific stakeholder groups from time to time. There is a precedent for this that has been set by the Under Secretary General from UN DESA meeting with civil society. Members of the European Parliament and several government delegations also do this. In the case of the Leadership Panel they have, at present, a member who is a prominent leader in African civil society.  He could facilitate greater interaction between the LP and CS in the region who are engaged in the IGF.

Outreach and awareness raising on the IGF in Africa

By creating the collaborative spaces mentioned above African civil society and also do better outreach and awareness raising on the IGF and NRIs around the content.

Regional post-IGF outreach on IGF messages

The IGF messages are not well known. The Secretariat, the MAG and the Leadership Panel should collaborate with the regional IGF MAG to convene outreach sessions after the annual IGF on the implications of IGF messages for the region.

5.2 Recommendations regarding the IGF’s Format and Content

Session proposal design and selection 

Resolving some of the internal contradictions and tensions in how the MAG selects proposals for workshops and other sessions could help strengthen African civil society participation and improve the IGF overall. This includes a better and more mindful balancing of considerations such as incentivising newcomers vs building continuity and adding value over time by having sessions that engage issues in depth. Also challenging is maximising inclusion through having a large number of sessions which creates an opportunity for people to be role players in creating a more focused and manageable event.

This is very difficult to balance but must be addressed by for example clustering proposals into different categories some of which follow up on previous discussions and others that raise new topics, promoting collaboration among proposers of session topics, or seeking session proposals to demonstrate sharing of regional experiences. The IGF MAG could benefit from working with a specialist in inclusive event design.

Thematic prioritisation by the MAG, hosts and Secretariat in programme design

An overall theme is usually identified for each annual IGF, usually with input from the host country. The MAG, based on input from the community, identifies the sub-themes that will shape the programme. This often results in a fairly wide range of subthemes. Instead of giving all themes equal prominence the IGF could identify one sub-theme to focus on in a particular year. This would enable African civil society to participate in a more substantive and prepared manner. For example, instead of ‘meaningful access’ being just one topic among many, it can be the primary focus of the IGF with the event structured to focus on different components of meeting this challenge e.g policy and regulation, investment, innovation, technology, sustainability, capacity development, content and so on.

This support could include:

  • Ensuring that identified organisations/individuals have the time available to participate in online meetings and discussions, and to submit written inputs. 
  • Establishing peer support groups that can also participate in the relevant BPF or PN and that can assist the designated individual or organisation with compiling inputs.

5.3 Recommendations for strengthened African civil society participation

Clarify expectations and set goals

It would be useful to clarify what African civil society hopes to gain from the IGF ecosystem, in general, and specifically in every annual cycle. It is recommended that CADE/KictaNet convenes a consultation online with African civil society involved in internet governance to review these recommendations and validate and revise them as needed. This consultation can also be used to clarify what the primary expectations of civil society are concerning the different elements of the IGF ecosystem. Once these have been captured and documented, it will be easier to assess progress. This can also be done by other existing networks among their own membership, e.g. among members of the Association for Progressive Communications in Africa, or members of African Internet Rights It would be useful to clarify what African civil society hopes to gain from the IGF ecosystem, in general, and specifically in every annual cycle. It is recommended that CADE/KictaNet convenes a consultation online with African civil society involved in internet governance to review these recommendations and validate and revise them as needed. This consultation can also be used to clarify what the primary expectations of civil society are concerning the different elements of the IGF ecosystem. Once these have been captured and documented, it will be easier to assess progress. This can also be done by other existing networks among their own membership, e.g. among members of the Association for Progressive Communications in Africa, or members of African Internet Rights Alliance (AIRA), of of the African Declaration on Internet Rights and Freedoms Coalition.38

Collective African input on IGF content and themes

African civil society could prepare and submit joint inputs into the open consultation process in response to the MAG’s call for topics and themes.  This will enable them to be more influential and to draw on the outcomes of the previous regional African IGF.

Once the theme and sub-themes for an upcoming annual IGF have been decided and communicated publicly, 

African civil society working with other stakeholder groups, particularly academic institutions, should compile position papers or white papers before the IGF on the regional priorities on the themes for that particular year. These documents could inform the global IGF and NRIs taking place around the continent. 

Strategic use of DCs, BPFs, and Policy Networks

These initiatives have the potential to influence policy, as they produce evidence, analysis and partnerships across stakeholder groups and disciplines. Increasing African civil society participation in them should be a priority. Rather than an approach that creates extra work for already overloaded individuals, people, and organisations that have existing interests and commitments in the work areas covered by the BPF or PN should lead this engagement. African civil society networks can convene early on in an IGF cycle to decide who would take on which intersessional work area. It is proposed that CADE develops a focused strategy for the duration of the project to facilitate and support specific African CS participation in IGF Best Practice Forums and Policy Networks.  

Foster defined African positions on specific internet/digital governance concerns

In its 2022 report on African participation in the IGF Diplo recommends the fostering of coordinated African positions in international digital governance spaces. While they refer primarily to states, they also advocate for a whole-of-society approach that includes civil society. Diplo suggests that the African Union and its Regional Economic Communities (RECs) be leveraged to ”coordinate and harmonise – where possible and relevant – African positions to be advocated for in international processes.”39 However, at present, despite several donor-funded initiatives, particularly in the area of data governance, the African Union and its organs do not appear to have the capacity to play an effective leadership role bringing consultative African positions and demands to the IGF; neither from an intergovernmental or multistakeholder perspective.

Civil society however does have the flexibility and networking capacity to do this if they have the required resources. Building on existing spaces such as Paradigm’s Digital Rights and Inclusion Forum (DRIF), CIPESA’s Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa (FIFA) and various national and regional IGFs could galvanise positions on existing priorities and more consistently take these forward at the IGF. 

Building a common agenda based on established recognised African declarations and strategy documents is an effective way of doing this. For example, The African Declaration on Internet Rights and Freedoms (2014); the African Commission on People and Human Rights’ Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression (2019) and the African Union Data Policy Framework (2022).

Existing coalitions such as the African Declaration on Internet Rights and Freedoms and the African Internet Rights Alliance can collaborate and work on a more inclusive basis on setting and influencing agendas at the IGF.

The same could be done in the priority area of “meaningful connectivity”. African civil society can collaborate with the technical community and regulators to build on the already extensive work done at the IGF by ISOC, the APC, KictaNet, and others to promote business models that would diversify internet access markets.

Create an online collaboration space or spaces for African CS in the IGF

Establish an online space – mailing list and or WhatsApp group — that can be used by African civil society to share information about the IGF. Currently, this info is available and distributed quite widely, and there is a multistakeholder “Africans in the IGF” WhatsApp group  but it can be more effective in one dedicated space for African civil society. Moderation and coordination could add value to this space, but even just an open information-sharing space can add value. 

As an alternative to creating new WhatsApp groups, periodic online discussions could be convened twice a year. Once after an annual IGF to do a debrief on the event, from an African CS perspective, and once prior to the event, to take stock of civil society participation and priorities.

Accommodate multilingualism

Crossing language barriers remains a challenge. There are good online translation tools available and they should be used in any pan-African online IG discussion space. 

Convene African face-to-face gatherings at the global and regional IGF

Convene on a routine basis a pre-event for African stakeholders like the one that takes place for LAC on Day 0. This is a multistakeholder event which can facilitate more collaboration within the region, but it also creates an incentive for CS to prepare as a stakeholder group and engage in strategic follow-up.

Convene an African civil society pre-event as a routine activity before every African IGF. This event can be used to strategise for the regional IGF and the global IGF. The same online space can support participation in both the global and the regional IGF.

Targeted strategic support for engagement that links global to regional to local

African civil society organisations could collaborate in proposing sessions to the global IGF which also have regional and national iterations. This could ease preparation and maximise impact.

Provide increased financial support, including for travel

There is a need for increased travel support and for making it more predictable.  Collaborative efforts from governments and donors are needed to support the participation of civil society, in particular from people with subject matter expertise in topics that are prominent in the IGF’s programme. Most travel funding seems to be oriented towards supporting younger people or newcomers to the process. There is a gap in funding for speakers or experts from civil society. 

Donors are also often reluctant to finance their partners’ participation in the IGF. They see it as just a conference, or a “talk shop”. Some prioritise support for their civil society partners to participate in events like RightsCon. These focused events are also important but the value of the IGF as a space where both like-minded and not-so-like-minded people and organisations can come together should not be underestimated. Moreover, funding is needed not just for travel, but for sustained engagement in policy advocacy and development.

“It is imperative to financially support African CSOs, advocating for Internet and digital rights. This would help keep Internet rights activists on the field. If activism is just [a] side-job, it is difficult to build sustainable advocacy work in Africa, where the change timeline is longer than in other regions.”

Capacity development

Continue the capacity-building initiatives like the Schools of Internet Governance (SIGs) such as the African School of Internet Governance, the Kenyan School of Internet Governance and the West African School of IG. Also important is Internet Society training. Participation in SIGs should be linked to that in IGFs and NRIs.

Introduce targeted fellowships for individuals embedded in organisations

Fellowships and internships can work well to provide opportunities for individuals. But this does not always work well for civil society, where impact relies on concrete links to organisations or movements. CADE should explore models used by the technical community used to strengthen for example youth participation (e.g. programmes provided by ICANN and ISOC) and adapt these so that they build concrete links to specific civil society organisations and ensure continuity over time as opposed to a once off attendance of an event.

5.4 Recommendations on avoiding duplication, and strengthening the multistakeholder approach, the IGF, and other related existing initiatives

Apply the NETmundial+10 Multistakeholder Statement: Strengthening Internet governance and digital policy

African civil society, NRIs, and the global IGF MAG, Secretariat, and Leadership Panel can all benefit from using the São Paulo Guiding Principles of 2024 to strengthen their application of the multistakeholder approach. These guidelines, aptly described by Jovan Kurbalija as providing “a breath of fresh air into digital governance debates” are useful to anyone involved in Internet governance. “The guidelines offer a pragmatic path forward by building on a solid experience of what works and does not in the field of digital governance.”40

Integrate Global Digital Compact follow-up and implementation with the next phase of the World Summit on the Information Society

African civil society already finds participation in UN-based internet governance forums challenging. There is a concern that the Global Digital Compact, adopted as part of the Summit on the Future in September 202441 will increase this challenge by creating new processes and concentrating digital cooperation in New York at UN headquarters rather than in Europe where it is currently based through the work done by UNESCO in Paris and  the International Telecommunications Union, the IGF Secretariat and the Commission for Science and Technology for Development in Geneva.

It is recommended that the UN system – including member states during the upcoming consideration of the IGF’s mandate as part of the WSIS 20-year review – strengthen existing processes for digital governance and cooperation such as the IGF, the WSIS Action Line process, and the WSIS Forum, rather than create new ones. 

The IGF has evolved into the world’s foremost and most inclusive forum for dialogue on not only Internet but also broader digital governance. Through NRIs and other intersessional components, the IGF ecosystem is suited to dealing with emerging issues and to alignment with the GDC and the Sustainable Development Goals. The IGF should be given a permanent mandate as well as the resources needed to strengthen its capacity and reach, particularly in Africa.

Establishing new channels for digital cooperation risks weakening African civil society participation which, as this study has found, is already not as strong and impactful as it should be.

  1. Interviewees include: Adam Peake, ICANN; Anja Genco, IGF Secretariat; Grace Githaiga, KictaNet;  Guy Berger, Research ICT Africa; Koliwe Majama, Mozilla Foundation; Lillian Nalwoga, CIPESA, chair of the African IGF Multistakeholder Advisory Group; Saba Tiku, member of the global IGF’s Multistakeholder Advisory Group and an active participant in the Youth IGF process; and Sorene Assefa, UN Economic Commission for Africa, currently the host of the Secretariat of the African IGF.  One interviewee preferred to remain anonymous. ↩︎
  2.  https://www.intgovforum.org/en/about#team ↩︎
  3. https://www.intgovforum.org/en/content/about-mag ↩︎
  4.  https://www.intgovforum.org/en/content/igf-leadership-panel-members ↩︎
  5. https://www.intgovforum.org/en/content/dynamic-coalitions  ↩︎
  6.  https://intgovforum.org/en/content/regional-igf-initiatives ↩︎
  7. Nonnecke, B.  (2016). The transformative effects of multistakeholderism in Internet governance: A case study of the East Africa Internet Governance Forum. Telecommunications Policy, 40(4), 343-352.  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2015.12.005 ↩︎
  8. https://intgovforum.org/en/content/best-practice-forums-bpfs ↩︎
  9. The final report of the CSTD Working Group is available at: unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/a67d65_en.pdf ↩︎
  10. https://intgovforum.org/en/content/policy-networks ↩︎
  11. Paragraph 93 (e) of the Report of the Secretary-General: Roadmap for Digital Cooperation. United Nations, June 2020. https://www.un.org/en/content/digital-cooperation-roadmap/assets/pdf/Roadmap_for_Digital_Cooperation_EN.pdf ↩︎
  12.  https://intgovforum.org/en/content/youth-initiatives ↩︎
  13.  https://www.intgovforum.org/en/content/youth-initiatives ↩︎
  14.  https://www.intgovforum.org/en/content/igf-2024-youth-track ↩︎
  15.   https://www.intgovforum.org/en/content/igf-2022-participation-and-programme-statistics ↩︎
  16.    https://www.intgovforum.org/en/content/igf-2023-participation-and-programme-statistics ↩︎
  17. WEOG – Western Europe and Other Group in the UN includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand the United Kingdom and the United States along with West European states. https://www.un.org/dgacm/en/content/regional-groups ↩︎
  18. https://intgovforum.org/content/igf-2019-participation-and-programme-statistics ↩︎
  19.  https://intgovforum.org/en/content/igf-2020-participation-and-programme-statistics  ↩︎
  20.    https://www.intgovforum.org/en/filedepot_download/223/20513 ↩︎
  21.   https://www.intgovforum.org/en/content/igf-2022-participation-and-programme-statistics ↩︎
  22.  https://www.intgovforum.org/en/content/igf-2023-participation-and-programme-statistics ↩︎
  23. NET EFFECTS p. 75 ↩︎
  24.  WEOG – Western Europe and Other Group in the UN includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States along with West European states. https://www.un.org/dgacm/en/content/regional-groups  ↩︎
  25. GRULAC – Latin America and the Caribbean ↩︎
  26.   https://www.intgovforum.org/en/filedepot_download/249/21963 ↩︎
  27. https://www.intgovforum.org/en/filedepot_download/272/25975 ↩︎
  28. hese statistics are taken from the speakers listed on the IGF site for that year, not from the programme. There might be  a discrepancy between actual speakers and how they were listed and promoted on the IGF website.  https://www.intgovforum.org/en/igf-2022-high-level-track ↩︎
  29.   https://www.intgovforum.org/en/igf-2022-high-level-track ↩︎
  30. https://intgovforum.org/en/content/igf-past-personnel ↩︎
  31.  Source: IGF Secretariat ↩︎
  32. IGF website: https://www.intgovforum.org/en/content/regional-igf-initiatives ↩︎
  33. p 35 IGF Dynamic Coalitions: Digital cooperation in practice. IGF, December 2021. ↩︎
  34. https://www.intgovforum.org/en/content/igf-2024-youth-track ↩︎
  35.  https://www.intgovforum.org/en/content/supporting-participation-at-the-annual-igf-meeting ↩︎
  36. https://intgovforum.org/en/content/mag-terms-of-reference ↩︎
  37.   https://intgovforum.org/en/content/working-group-on-igf-strengthening-and-strategy-wg-strategy ↩︎
  38. Association for Progressive Communications (APC); African Internet Rights Alliance (AIRA) and African Declaration on Internet Rights and Freedoms Coalition ↩︎
  39. p. 105 https://www.diplomacy.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/African-digital-foreign-policy_En.pdf ↩︎
  40. https://www.diplomacy.edu/blog/sao-paulo-multistakeholder-guidelines-a-breath-of-fresh-air-into-digital-governance-debates/ ↩︎
  41.  https://www.un.org/techenvoy/global-digital-compact ↩︎

Civil Society Alliances for Digital Empowerment (CADE) is a project co-funded by the European Union.

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