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Civil Society Organisations Engagement in Internet Governance Legal Frameworks: The Case of Cybercrime Laws

January 2025

Policy Reports

The Case of Cybercrime Laws in the MENA region

Civil society organisations (CSOs) play a crucial role in shaping digital infrastructure and internet governance, including cybercrime laws. Their role has become even more critical in the context of increasing crackdowns on freedom of expression and civic engagement. This case study explores how CSOs in the Arab region, particularly in Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, have engaged in the development of cybercrime legal frameworks.

Using a qualitative methodology, the study assesses the level of CSO involvement in these countries’ drafting, issuance, and amendment of cybercrime laws based on in-depth interviews with digital rights activists and organisations. The paper concludes that CSOs’ influence on cybercrime laws has been limited, despite their wide range of advocacy methods, including lobbying, awareness-raising, legal advocacy, coalition-building, direct action, international advocacy, and digital advocacy. It identifies the tools and techniques used by CSOs to influence the lawmaking process and analyses the effectiveness of their efforts, highlighting both the challenges and successes encountered.

Introduction 

In recent years, several countries in the Arab region have enacted or updated cybercrime laws aimed at addressing and combating the rise of digital crime. According to research published by technology company IBM1, conclusions underline the increasing threat of cybercrime in the middle east, specifically in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. With cybercrime costing over USD8 million per incident in 2023, these countries rank second globally in terms of the financial damage from cyberattacks.

Theoretically, cybercrime law ‘identifies standards of acceptable behaviour for information and communication technology (ICT) users; establishes socio-legal sanctions for cybercrime; protects ICT users, in general, and mitigates and/or prevents harm to people, data, systems, services, and infrastructure, in particular; protects human rights; enables the investigation and prosecution of crimes committed online (outside of traditional real-world settings); and facilitates cooperation between countries on cybercrime matters’, as defined by United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime2.

However, cybercrime laws in the Arab region are frequently used by governments to suppress dissent, posing a threat to freedom of expression3. Many of these laws prohibit various forms of online speech using broad and unclear language that legitimises prosecuting human rights defenders who criticise governments and officials. According to the National Center for Human Rights report4, Jordan arrested 1,821 individuals in 2018 under its cybercrime law, most of them academics, media activists, online journalists, and citizens, on charges of defamation, slander, and contempt that were brought against them by public figures.

On the other hand, cybercrime laws in the Arab region raised other concerns about the impact on data privacy. Some laws allow for surveillance and communications to be intercepted, without sufficient safeguards, in addition to enabling internet service providers from processing data without the need for judicial authorisation or users’ pre-consent. A policy paper published by Access Now in 20245 has stated that this kind of mass data collection and processing allows for precise conclusions to be inferred about people’s daily habits and movements, their usual place of residence, their social connections, and other details.

These regulations have been widely slammed by CSOs6 that often face significant challenges in participating meaningfully in law issuance processes, even in areas that directly affect their operations. Cybercrime laws are a crucial regulatory aspect of internet governance7, especially in that they impose restrictions on human rights activists and organisations, violating their freedom of expression, access to information and right to privacy. Thus, it is vital to understand how CSOs in the selected Arab countries have engaged in their creation, modification, or opposition.

This case study aims to examine examining how CSOs have engaged in the development of cybercrime laws in the Arab region, following a qualitative methodology that assesses the level of engagement by CSOs in the drafting, issuance, and amendment of cybercrime laws in selected Arab countries, in light of in-depth research interviews conducted with digital rights activists and organisations. The theoretical framework presents an overview of the cybercrime laws in the region, while The study’s findings discuss CSOs engagement during the legal processes of issuing cybercrime laws, and identify advocacy methods that CSOs employ to impact policies.

Cybercrime laws in the Arab region 

The existence of clear legal frameworks that govern online spaces was essential to achieve the security and privacy of people’s digital rights, which eventually affects their physical interaction and offline practices8. Arab governments have tried to mediate such new media by issuing cybercrime laws that act as a legal recourse where crimes and penalties are identified, alongside other laws, policies and agreements that regulate the online sphere9.

The internet bloom in the Arab world has provided an unprecedented opportunity for accessing information, expressing opinions, digital organisation and political participation10. Between 2010- and 2012, social media platforms played a critical role in facilitating communication among participants of political protests during the revolutionary wave of demonstrations globally referred to as the ‘Arab Spring’, despite the ongoing debate over criticising their role of social media11. 

On the other hand, the information and communication technology revolution has also brought concerns over illegal online practices such as money laundering, drug distribution, copyright infringement, software piracy, and gambling12, in addition to publishing harmful content, such as defamation, incitement to violence, hate speech, child sexual abuse and pornography, terrorism, and other extreme violence13.

The need for specialized regulations that address cybercrime laws emerged due to the lack of enough frameworks concerning the technical nature of cybercrime and online platforms14. Out of 22 Arab countries, 13 countries have enacted legislation to deal with cybercrime, while the rest apply existing laws to these new crimes. However, most cybercrime laws in Arab countries (with respect to their different names) have been shaped to control the platforms and online content rather than adopting a proactive approach that protects users’ rights.

The first Arab country that enacted a cybercrime law was the UAE in 200615 which also inspired and influenced other drafts in the region in terms of charges and penalties16. Despite Saudi Arabia and Sudan’s drafts followed one year later, the majority of cybercrime laws in other countries have been issued around ‘the Arab Spring’, where governments moved towards criminalising speech and restricting online platforms used for mobilising people17. 

Such laws failed to meet the basic principles stated in local constitutions and international standards of freedom of expression. Still, they constituted, a legitimate tool that impeded dialogue, curbed freedom of expression, and marginalised people’s data18. Even the Arab Convention on Combating Technology Offences, which was signed by most Arab countries19, did not balance the protection of freedom of expression and public interests, including national security and public morals.

Table (1) shows the chronological order of which cybercrime laws were issued in the Arab region. 

No. Country Year of issuance Official name English translation Link 
1UAE 202006مرسوم بقانون اتحادي رقم (٥) لسنة ٢٠١٢ في شأن مكافحة جرائم تقنية المعلوماتFederal Decree-Law No. (5) of 2012 on Combating CybercrimesLink
2Saudi Arabia 2007 نظام مكافحة الجريمة الالكترونية م/١٧، ١٤٢٨/٣/٨ هAnti-Cyber Crime Law, Royal Decree No. M/17, 26 March 2007Link
3Sudan 200721 قانون مكافحة جرائم المعلوماتية Law to Combat Information Crimes 2007Link 
4Algeria 2009القانون رقم 09 – 04 المؤرخ في 05 أوت سنة 2009Law No. 09-04 of 14 Chaabane 1430Link 
5Jordan 201022قانون الجرائم الالكترونية رقم 17 لسنة 2023 Cybercrime Law, Law No. 17 of 2023Link 
6Oman 2011 مرسوم سلطاني رقم ٢٠١١/١٢ بإصدار قانون مكافحة جرائم تقنية المعلوماتRoyal Decree No 12/2011 issuing the Cyber Crime LawLink 
7Syria 201223قانون الجرائم المعلوماتية رقم 20 للعام 2022Cybercrime Law No. 20 of 2022Link 
8Bahrain2014قانون رقم (٦٠) لسنة ٢٠١٤ بشأن جرائم تقنية المعلوماتLaw No. (60) of 2014 on Information Technology CrimesLink 
9Qatar2014قانون رقم (١٤) لسنة ٢٠١٤ بإصدار قانون مكافحة الجريمة الإلكترونيةLaw No. (14) of 2014 Promulgating the Cybercrime Prevention LawLink 
10Kuwait 2015قانون رقم (٦٣) لسنة ٢٠١٥ في شأن مكافحة جرائم تقنية المعلوماتLaw No. (63) for the year 2015 on Combating Information Technology CrimesLink 
11Mauritania 2016 القانون رقم 2016-007 بشأن الجرائم الإلكترونيةLaw No. 2016-007 on CybercrimeLink 
12Egypt 2018قانون مكافحة جرائم تقنية المعلومات رقم 175 لسنة 2018Law No. 175 of 2018 on Combating Information Technology CrimesLink 
13Palestine2018قانون رقم (10) لسنة 2018م بشأن الجرائم الإلكترونيةLaw No. (10) of 2018 on CybercrimesLink 

In general, according to a policy paper conducted by Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism (ARIJ) and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom24, cybercrime laws in Arab countries agree on criminalising the following points: 

  • illegal access to any information system or network to change data or information
  • disabling any website or electronic service
  • violation of the privacy and protection  of  correspondence and communications of individuals
  • disseminatiion of child pornography
  • forging  of an electronic signature
  • seizure of money (or credit card data) using fraudulent methods
  • human trafficking
  • drug trafficking
  • money laundering
  • gambling
  • terrorism and the promotion or financing of the terrorist ideology
  • dissemination of information on how to manufacture incendiary or explosive devices
  • obtaining confidential government information

Additionally, most of the laws have used general terms and contain no clear definition of what constitutes ‘indecent‘ material; it can, therefore, be used to criminalise many types of content published on the internet25. In a number of countries, such legislation on cybercrime includes provisions on criminalising the ‘dissemination of false information‘, ‘offensive messages‘, ‘spreading of rumours‘, ‘character assassination via social media‘, ‘solicitation to commit lechery‘, ‘condoning sins‘ and other conduct, leveraging cybercrime laws to suppress digital rights.

For example, according to Human Rights Watch26 Tunisian authorities have sentenced at least 20 journalists, lawyers, students, and other critics for their public statements online or in the media under a 2022 cybercrime decree. In these cases, authorities relied on Article 24 that provides for imprisonment of five years and a fine of 50,000 dinars (USD16,000), for whoever publishes content with the aim of violating the rights of others, harming public security or national defence, spreading terror among the population, or inciting hate speech27.

This also highlights the heavy fines and punishments that such provisions stipulate for non-criminal charges, resulting in self-censorship and selective justice28.  For example, in 2022, Saudi Arabia sentenced a woman, Salma al-Shehab,  to 34 years in prison over her Twitter activity29, after Saudi Arabia’s special terrorist court convicted her of ‘causing public unrest and destabilising civil and national security’ under the terrorism act30.

Cybercrime laws allow for legal referrals to other regulations when charges are stated in more than one law, which also leaves room for relative judicial interpretation and the interference of political bodies31. 

Cybercrime laws have also allowed public prosecutors or courts to ‘remove, block, stop, disable, register or intercept the data path, or prevent access to it, or temporarily ban the user or publisher’ of websites, social media platforms, or people in charge of public online accounts32. Egypt practices broad censorship of the internet and enables executive authorities to block websites in 2017 even before their cybercrime law was issued. However, the number of blocked sites in Egypt had reached at least 500 by June, 2018, as Article 7 of the law gives the investigative authority the power to order a website blocked whenever it deems the content to constitute a crime or a threat to security, or a danger to national security or the economy33.

Such legal articles also enabled authorities to ban social media platforms as a whole, despite the economic impact that might affect users, including influencers, small business owners, and journalists, who use such platforms for a living. Article 37 (a) of Jordan’s 2023 Cybercrime Law requires any social media platform outside Jordan, with more than 100,000 subscribers in Jordan, to establish an office inside Jordan, deal with any requests and notices issued by the competent Jordanian judicial and official authorities. Otherwise, platforms will incur a ban or a reduction in the bandwidth of internet traffic34.

Despite the local contexts of each country in terms of political circumstances and economic conditions, cybercrime laws in the Arab region share a lot of restrictions and violations in common, especially that governments viewed the ICT revolution as a challenge to their authority rather than an opportunity. Nevertheless, CSOs have had varying experiences trying to engage with the laws’ creation, modification, or opposition, given the different legislative processes and factors influencing them in each country.

Methodology 

  • This case study employs a qualitative research methodology to assess the level of engagement by CSOs in the drafting, issuance, and amendment of cybercrime laws in selected Arab countries. The research draws on three primary data sources: Desk Research, which analyzes existing cybercrime laws, policy documents, and reports on CSO engagement in legal processes in the MENA region;
  • Key Informant Interviews, involving semi-structured interviews with CSO leaders, legal experts, policymakers, and representatives from the targeted MENA countries;
  • Case Study Guide, the CADE Regional Case Study Guide, which provides a framework for data collection and analysis to ensure consistency across the countries in the sample.

The study adopts social change theory to categorise different advocacy types, methods, and tools used by CSOs, positing that social change follows a patterned, rather than an arbitrary, course. Data collection methods include secondary data analysis (e.g., government documents, law amendments, and CSO publications) and an interview guide focused on engagement strategies and challenges. The study samples at least one representative country from each sub-region within MENA – Gulf, Levant, Egypt, and Maghreb – interviewing CSO representatives directly involved in cybercrime law processes, policymakers, and stakeholders in relevant internet governance frameworks. Six organisations from different Arab countries participated in the in-depth interviews, with one more participant opting to remain anonymous.

Findings and Discussion 

Assessing CSOs engagement in the legal process of issuing cybercrime laws

The legislative authority carries out specific constitutional duties, such as creating laws, approving the budget, overseeing the executive branch, and holding it accountable through questioning and investigation. Additionally, it reflects the views of the citizens, addressing different issues and aspects of life35. In the Arab world, the process of lawmaking involves many technical and procedural details, yet it is typically linked to parliamentary bodies. One of the core functions of the parliament or the national assembly, which usually consists of chambers or houses, is to issue and/or pass laws; thus, the ability to modify or influence laws often depends on the effectiveness of this body and its engagement with societies36.

In Jordan, for example, a draft law is submitted by the government to the House of Representatives, or vice versa. Draft laws always end up in the hands of the House of Representatives, where they get included in the agenda for discussion, deliberation, and suggestions from relevant committees. The National Assembly, the House of Representatives, and the Senate engage in a voting process according to specific guidelines. Later, any draft law approved by both of them will be submitted to the king for ratification and publication in the official gazette, unless stated otherwise37.

In this way, several versions of the Cybercrime Law in Jordan have been approved, and in practice, these steps generally apply to several other Arab countries, such as Lebanon, Iraq, and Tunisia38. A digital rights expert (preferring to stay anonymous) at the Gulf Centre for Human Rights (GCHR) adds that ‘Oftentimes an executive institution would be created prior or shortly after these laws are enforced, for example, specialised police cybercrime units. In some cases there would be special courts created for cybercrime cases.’

Nevertheless, some countries have restricted the legislative powers of their parliaments. Ali Abdulemam from digital rights organisation Red Line 4 Gulf, states that the Bahraini parliament does not have the right to propose or draft laws, as its role is limited to approving the legislation that comes from the royal court or reviewing it to provide comments according to the internal regulations. This applies to the Bahraini Cybercrime Law, which was enacted in 2014.

These limited powers of the House of Representatives give monopoly powers for the legislative process by governmental or presidential entities, such as ministries or the royal court, which also reduces the level of democratic participation in lawmaking. Legislative powers are not only concentrated in specific bodies, but also in certain figures. The legislative process in Tunisia is carried out by the president himself. President Kais Saied is able to propose, enact, and ratify laws without consulting the relevant authorities or involving the people in their decisions, thus bypassing the activation of a democratic legislative process39. 

Human rights activist Yousra Al-Khadrawi from Tunisia states that the legislative process in Tunisia used to be carried out in a participatory manner after the 2011 uprising, where various sectors of civil society, unions, and parties directly affected by the law would meet with parliamentarians in hearing sessions to discuss laws and take into account the proposals submitted, whether the legislative initiative came from the government or from the parliament itself.

For example, in 2016, AlBawsala, a Tunisian human rights organisation, along with other digital rights organisations like Access Now, participated in the biometric identity bill through public hearings40. However, this democratic process disappeared in 2021. Tunisia shifted to a more unilateral and non-transparent approach to passing laws without involving any parties and excluding civil society, after the Tunisian president dissolved the parliament41. This resulted in the 2021 draft Cybercrime Law passing through the People’s Assembly without consultations or the inclusion of civil society.

The absence of democratic bodies allows for the passage of repressive legislation, but their presence would not necessarily guarantee improvements in draft versions, especially when parliaments align with oppressive regimes and serve their interests. Mohamed Al-Taher from Masaar, a group of lawyers and technologists in Egypt, states that popular and civil participation in lawmaking is almost non-existent, as laws come from the state and are passed directly through the House of Representatives without any societal dialogue42. ‘The process of enacting laws in Egypt is very procedural, and this was evident when the House of Representatives approved the draft Cybercrime Law in a meeting without any objections,’ he said, noting that this applies to other laws as well.

Additionally, Abdulemam stated that the Bahraini parliament cannot be seen as a legitimate representative of the people or a body with full powers, legislative capacity, or independence capable of challenging the state, even though its members are theoretically elected43. This means that the passage of a law through the local legal process shaped and drafted by the state does not guarantee that the law is legitimate, especially since these official channels are unjust. In such cases, governments or the ruling family do not need to bypass the official legal process to pass laws because the existing paths are sufficient for their purposes.

On the contrary, there were some members of the Jordanian parliament who opposed the 2023 version of the Cybercrime Law and voted against it44. However, the limited time available between proposing the draft and issuing it prevented civil society from effectively communicating with parliamentarians and coordinating efforts to object to the law. Yara Alrafie from the Jordan Open Source Association (JOSA), a digital rights organisation, states that the final version of the law was issued by royal decree, which carries a sense of urgency or priority.

While this is legal, it is a privilege that deprived civil society of the opportunity to provide consultations or apply pressure tactics.

On other occasions, public pressure, political lobbying, and civic engagement have prevented passing Jordan’s cybercrime draft in 2018, despite a worse version that passed later as the draft Cybercrime Law of 202345. In the case of Iraq, Hayder Hamzoz, founder and CEO of the Iraqi Network for Social Media (INSM), a digital rights activist network, stated that CSOs in Iraq try to take advantage of political disagreements between ministries over the law’s implementation powers to prevent the approval of the currently proposed version in the House of Representatives, in order to gain more time to propose amendments and improve the draft.

In conclusion, all experts and activists who were interviewed stated that the space available for civil society in the Arab region to influence the legislative process, including the Cybercrime Law, is limited to narrow margins surrounded by many challenges, especially that authorities resort to exploiting security, political, health, and economic conditions to impose martial law and exceptional circumstances that allow for the passage of repressive laws. 

Methods and tools used by CSOs 

Advocacy is defined as ‘the pursuit of influencing outcome – including policy and resource allocation decisions within political, economic, and social systems and institutions – that directly affect people’s lives’46. Increasingly, it is taking an ever more central place in the role of CSOs, which monitor government policies and actions and hold the government accountable47. They are commonly described as the fourth power’ within a state, reflecting the belief in the significant influence in driving legislative change. 

In the case of the internet governance legal framework, including cybercrime laws, CSOs in the Arab region have implemented different methods and approaches to impact the process of issuing laws. This part of the paper maps the different advocacy types in which CSOs have tried to impact the laws. According to interviews, CSOs have implemented activities and tools that fall under these approaches of advocacy: lobbying, raising awareness, legal advocacy, coalition building, direct action advocacy, international advocacy and digital or online advocacy. 

These advocacy approaches will be explained accordingly, drawing on concrete examples and insights of organisations and activists.

Lobbying 

It is common to use the terms lobbying and advocacy interchangeably, but there is an important difference between them. Lobbying indicates a position on specific legislative change48. Thus, all lobbying is advocacy, but not all advocacy is lobbying, as advocacy generally refers to arguing in favor of (or against) a cause or idea. A few examples of lobbying could be drawn from the experience of CSOs in the Arab region, challenging cybercrime laws in their countries.

Also, these examples are defined as direct lobbying, which attempts to influence new or existing legislation via communication with a member of the legislative body or other government representative who has a say in the legislation49. However, grassroots lobbying is rarely implemented, as it requires mobilising the public around a legislative issue on a long term utilising different resources and tools.

AlKhadrawi states that hearings and consultations at the Tunisian Parliament were one of the lobbying techniques that Tunisian CSOs have relied on to have a significant impact in improving draft laws. However, these consultations stopped after 2021, when the version of the cybercrime law was approved amid exceptional circumstances. However, interventions in public hearings conducted by the parliament are not advocacy campaigns by themselves, but they could be if they were part of a broader action plan that clarifies objectives and steps.  

In the case of Iraq, CSOs have held several hearings with the Iraqi parliament to provide feedback on the draft cybercrime law of 2011. Hamzouz says that their efforts have delayed the law’s passage so far, allowing more time to amend it. The organisations participated in these hearings, alongside committee members representing various ministries, to discuss its provisions and explain the legal challenges. ‘Some official bodies lacked a proper understanding of the technical terms in the draft law, which digital rights organisations were trying to clarify and explain,’ Hamzouz says. 

Jordanian CSOs had a similar experience regarding the lack of understanding technical terms, despite that organisations were sharing contributions and comments with political parties and PMs without being invited to attend sessions or initiate meetings with stakeholders. Alrafie says that some of Jordanian PMs didn’t understand the meaning of many technical terms like, ISPs, VPN or IP address. JOSA has published a policy paper mapping technical bugs related to the scope and definitions of the law, this paper was publicly published and shared with the Parliament50. 

When asked, only two out of seven interviewees stated that their organisations have been engaged in different forms of public consultations as a lobbying technique to impact cybercrime laws. In addition, both of these mentioned that this method was the most effective way to engage with policymakers and track their positions on the law, as they interact with people, explain their opinions, and win more people to their side. 

Raising awareness 

Awareness-raising is a form of advocacy, and can be directed at a variety of audiences, including policymakers, government officials, and the general public. Awareness-raising is ‘a process that seeks to inform and educate people about a topic or issue with the intention of influencing their attitudes, behaviours and beliefs towards the achievement of a defined purpose or goal51. According to interviews, all CSOs in the Arab region implemented awareness-raising activities in their pursuit to advocate against repressive cybercrime laws, as these activities helped them know the reality of the situation before changing it, and conduct a rapid assessment of the situation.

CSOs’ awareness-raising activities mainly took place online, including publishing research papers, coordinating with media outlets, carrying out online campaigns and implementing influencer marketing, as mapped from interviews. Only two organisations have conducted offline security sessions as an activity to raise awareness of the law and offer relevant security tips. These workshops and training have targeted journalists, human rights defenders ,and politicians, who are more most exposed to arrests. 

GCHR’s expert mentioned that her organisation has advocated against vague and broad provisions of the law, by conducting research reports analysing cybercrime laws in the Gulf region. These reports are essential for raising awareness and conducting research-based advocacy. According to the expert, findings from these reports have been used in various advocacy efforts, such as before the UNHRC and the EU, and for issuing appeals or signing joint statements to repeal the criminalisation of digital rights.

CSOs in Egypt had also engaged similarly with the law, Altaher says that most Egyptian CSOs have something to criticise about the law, but the closed political situation has made talking about it the maximum effort they can make. Altaher’s organisation has published different articles, statements and social media posts highlighting the concerns on the law’s article, in an attempt to provide a policy analysis source for researchers and journalists who are interested in reporting on the issue.

Similar online campaigns have also been launched in Jordan. Alrafie says that they reached out to social media influencers and digital creators to advocate for their cause and raise awareness on the issue, as influencers are one of the top social segments who are negatively impacted by the law’s restrictions on platforms where they publish their content and generate profit. The hashtag #Withdraw_the_Cybercrime_Law52 topped the list of trending hashtags on social media in Jordan in July 2023.

Online campaigns can mobilise the power of public opinion in support of an issue and thereby influence the political will of decision-makers. However, awareness-raising can mean different things in different circumstances, indicating a wide variety of experiences, and it’s difficult to assess the impact of these activities, especially when they’re not attached to SMART goals (usually referring to specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound). Although the use of digital advocacy has been promoted for successful campaigns, most interviewees stated that awareness-raising activities by themselves did not lead to concrete action on the ground, as many research papers on advocacy have concluded53. 

Coalition building

Coalition building is ‘the process by which parties (individuals, organisations, or nations) come together to form an alliance or partnering of groups in order to achieve a common purpose or to engage in joint activity’54. By working together, coalition members can increase and expand their influence, and make a stronger case for policy change among different audiences. Research on advocacy has concluded that coalition building creates more effective strategies and can empower marginalised groups. The diversity within coalitions broadens their reach, allowing for tailored messaging to different policymakers55. Additionally, coalitions raise visibility, garner media attention, and build political clout, increasing the chances of success in securing policy change.

In addition to raising awareness, coalition building is the top advocacy method used by CSOs in the Arab region to advocate for better cybercrime laws. In each country, organisations have utilised efforts to share a unified position on the law, increased visibility and collective action, and built a solidarity network. AlKhadrawi says that more than five Tunisian organisations and unions56 have called on authorities to withdraw the cybercrime decree ‘as it contradicts the goals of the [2011] revolution … and contains threats against anyone who initiates an opinion contrary to the authority’, according to the statement57.

Following statements condemned the law and urged the president to withdraw it with immediate effect. For example,‘the undersigned human rights associations and organisations have expressed their deep alarm regarding specific provisions of the law and their flagrant contravention of the Tunisian Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Tunisia has ratified’58. Similar statements were signed by different segments of the civil society, including grassroots movements, local organisations, regional and international NGOs, and activists. 

Hamzouz said that joint statements and online petitions help to direct the focus of all stakeholders on the unresolved issues and make better use of the expert’s time and evidence. He also added that coalition-building activities could take different forms, such as joining digital rights conferences concerning the situation in the Arab region. According to him, these events enable communication and networking between organisations, and constitute a free space where they reflect on their techniques and approaches to hold government and big tech organisations accountable. 

According to author Sam Grant, while coalition building can be powerful, it also presents several challenges. Differences in priorities, values, and strategies among diverse members can lead to conflicts and slow decision-making. Aligning goals can be difficult, especially when coalition members represent varying sectors with different agendas. Managing power dynamics is another hurdle, as larger or more influential groups may dominate discussions, potentially sidelining smaller or marginalised members. Additionally, coordinating efforts and maintaining clear communication across multiple organisations can be complex and time-consuming59. 

Direct action advocacy

Direct action is defined as ‘a form of action where people use their power to directly achieve political goals’60. Unlike indirect methods like voting or lobbying politicians, people taking direct action aim to meet their goals through their own activity, rather than the actions of others. Direct action may include activities (often nonviolent), targeting people, groups, institutions, actions, or property whose participants deem objectionable. Nonviolent direct action may include civil disobedience, sit-ins, strikes, and counter-economics.

Some Arab capitals have witnessed protests and demonstrations that demanded the withdrawal of the law, citing concerns over its potential repercussions on society61. In Amman, hundreds of citizens took to the streets and chanted slogans denouncing restrictions on freedom of expression in front of the national assembly and downtown, according to Alrafie. More protests followed when the law was actually used against activities demonstrating pro-Palestine sentiment after October 2023, and to punish individuals with harsh sentences of up to five years62. 

Alrafie said the CSOs have actively participated in coordination with political parties – mostly informally. However, organisations had limited powers in calling for these protests due to security concerns. On the other hand, AlKhadrawi added that Tunisian authorities have suppressed several demonstrations calling for the abolition or amendment of the law, some of which have seen activists arrested, which has fostered self-censorship and limited the ability of organisations to participate in direct action advocacy. 

Other countries have not witnessed any protests against the law due to different reasons. The political and human rights protest movement in Egypt has been very limited since 2011, due to repressive measures and arbitrary detentions. Altaher says that the crackdown on freedom of expression after the revolution has reached alarming new levels unparalleled in Egypt’s recent history, and it has currently become more dangerous to organise protests or even criticise the government. 

Additionally, Abdulemam stated that Bahrain’s cybercrime laws were passed amid a ‘phase of constitutional reform’ and intense security events that occupied headlines. These local conditions and disturbing decisions, such as terrorism law amendments which allows for nationality’s withdrawal, have taken the light and shifted attention from the cybercrime law. As digital rights are often visualised as secondary, governments tend to take advantage of political conditions to pass repressive regulations.

Legal advocacy

Legal advocacy occurs when lawyers represent someone (their client) in a court or tribunal. This means they do and say things on their client’s behalf63. Legal advocacy includes educating and assisting victims in navigating justice systems; assisting victims in evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of participating in legal processes; and facilitating victims’ access and participation in legal systems.

Legal advocacy is often perceived as public policy advocacy, but the first concerns the justice systems rather than the regulations themselves, which are addressed in the second64. However, Legal advocacy activities could help resist violations in the legal framework. When Arab CSOs realised their limited impact on the cybercrime drafts and legal amendment process, some of them allocated resources to represent victims of the law, minimising charges and securing fair trials and a strong defence. 

Legal assistance or aid organisations are a whole sector of civil society entities that exist to support accused activists and journalists, document human rights violations, and produce statistics on arrests and cases. Altaher says that this approach could be effective when you can trust the independence of judiciary procedures, but when the system is vague and relative, the effectiveness of legal efforts are minimised. 

In one example, Abdelemam stated that legal representations helped some activists win their cases, including ones filed outside the country. Notably, the High Court in London convicted the ruling Al Khalifa regime in Bahrain in a case of spying on dissidents in 2023. In that case, the exiled Bahraini activist Yousef Al-Jamri, started legal action against his country’s government after discovering that his phone was being spied on electronically by the Israeli Pegasus spyware in 2019.

Security assistance services function in parallel with legal aid programmes, as activists face risks of surveillance, harassment, or physical threats. Regular security checks, such as encrypting communications, securing social media accounts, and using VPNs, protect valuable data, communications, or contacts that could be exploited by authorities or malicious actors if not properly secured. When arrested, security measures can help protect sensitive digital information and prevent further risks to personal safety and privacy.

International advocacy 

International advocacy targets a worldwide audience and national policymakers involved in international processes65. It could bring change in international agreements about a specific issue or call on international stakeholders to pressure local regulators during policy-making and shaping processes. International advocacy could intersect with networking and coalition-building advocacy, as well as legal advocacy, as international organisations take part in alliances and their activities, and local or regional organisations use international legal systems to impact the drafting and enforcement of laws. 

According to case study interviews, different forms of international advocacy have been widely adopted by Arab CSOs in the case of cybercrime law. Abdelemam says that this approach is essential for national organisations based abroad, especially when the local civil society scene lacks independent organisations and watchdogs. Arab human rights organisations and activists, based abroad, mostly in Europe, are still exposed to attacks and surveillance, but they provide an alternative perspective for lobbying as well. 

Nardine states that the GCHR reported to mechanisms such as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); for example, one of  the GCHR;s reports has been aiding theGeneva OCHRC advocacy as actors can refer to country-specific insights and evidence. This approach helped them collaborate within and beyond the region which opened new spaces for advocacy, for example, investors and businesses, ‘While documentation can be challenging in certain contexts, it has been the most effective to demonstrate concrete consequences of cybercrimes laws and their abuse’, Nardine said. 

The level of Arab governments’ response to international recommendations related to freedom of opinion and expression is very low, Altaher said, as he took part in two Universal Periodic Review (UPR) rounds in Egypt without witnessing any changes in the law. Despite that, international advocacy is perceived differently in Iraq,;  Hamzouz stated that the engagement of international organisations in national advocacy campaigns has facilitated their communication with official stakeholders, ‘it counts when international organisations show up at hearing sessions and consultations besides local and regional digital and human rights organisations, as the government fears international accountability and sanctions’.

Exploring successes and challenges 

Arab organisations have managed to achieve a few goals in their advocacy against improper cybercrime laws in the region using different approaches, methods and tools. In some countries, organisations were able to modify unjust laws, which is the ultimate goal of most of the campaigns. In the case of Iraq’s cybercrimes law, which has not been issued yet, Hamzouz said that CSOs recommendations and comments during regular consultations and follow-ups led to changing some loose terminologies in the articles and changing the phrasing in others to be more accurate. 

In Hamzouz’s opinion, one of the most significant successes of these efforts is that they managed to change the name of the law. The old version of Iraq’s law indicates criminalising the medium itself rather than harmful actions that could take occur on a platform. Official committees have considered an alternative wording for the title, representing more objectivity and good intent. Hamzouz stated that continuous civil efforts could have resulted in delaying the issuance of the law until it met the principles of the Iraqi constitution. 

However, other existing regulatory frameworks, like the penal code and the publications law, could be used to prosecute journalists and issue sentences against them. In addition, passing amendments to a law’s provisions might not always be considered a success. In 2023, the senate approved some amendments to Jordan’s cybercrime draft, reducing fines for some charges and allowing the judiciary to choose among fines, imprisonment, or both penalties for crimes like spreading false news, defamation, slander, or contempt.

Alrafie stated that such amendments have changed nothing at the law’s core, as radical changes to the articles were not considered, and more broad charges were passed. ‘Even if the fine is reduced from 50K JDs to 20K JDs [JOD 50,000 to JOD 20,000] for some articles, it is still a huge amount of money, no one can afford these fines for a Facebook post in a country where minimum wages don’t exceed 290 JDs (around [USD] 3,500 annually)’, she noted, adding that these tiny impactless amendments help governments claim cooperation with civil society without leading to any real change in policy. 

In most Arab countries, CSO advocacy against cybercrime has little impact on the drafts. Interviewees on average evaluated the effectiveness of their engagement at 3 out of 10, despite their engagement rates reaching 7 out of 10. Nardine said ‘It is difficult to assess the efficacy of our effort. These regimes often have strong ties and interest in solidifying their tight grip on power. Resources at their disposal outweigh our capacity to do the remedial, advocacy, and documentary work we do.’

On the other hand, CSO advocacy managed to achieve individual success in specific cases where activists were prosecuted. Abdelemam stated that legal assistance and popular pressure helped release some activists, reduce their sentences, or substitute their sentences with social service. However, the scale of these small achievements is very relative depending on the national conditions and political opportunities. They also support individuals case by case but don’t lead a change at the level of the law itself. 

According to Altaher, CSOs in Egypt can claim one outstanding success from their advocacy, which is ‘making the law notorious’. In his opinion, CSO posts, statements, research work, reports, and petitions have shaped a negative narrative around cybercrime law locally and internationally, and increased awareness of the human rights concerns it addresses, especially when the law’s provisions became attached to actual cases involving activists and influencers. 

All intervieweesstated that the impactful public policies required a supporting political will in the first place. In other words, if authorities are not welcoming CSO contributions and creating mechanisms where civil society can engage, changing regulations would be very difficult and advocacy efforts won’t be effective. According to the interviewees, activists and organisations identified a lack of political will and hostile government responses to their demands as a top challenge, ‘it’s not that CSOs cannot lead change, but it’s how the system is designed to ignore their contribution and restrict it’, said Abdelemam.

Organisations have also identified other challenges, such as insufficient technical expertise, limited resources, a lack of understanding of the policy-making process, limited persuasive evidence, self-censorship and poor coordination between organisations. These challenges have been manifested in organisations’ experiences, as each advocacy method also had detailed challenges and restrictions depending on the context.

In general, interviewees considered that adapting advocacy methods and activities should be part of a detailed long-term collaborative strategy, but when activities are performed out of context as a response or a reaction to policies, or misinterpreted as goals rather than methods, organisations’ efforts become random and temporary. Alrafie says that CSO campaigns, including alliances, lack sustainability, grassroots advocacy, and evaluation of the needs of local communities, needed to ensure that these are considered when setting priorities and shaping policies.

Conclusion 

CSOs frequently play a role in influencing government policies, programmes, and strategies through consultations, discussions, and public hearings, often representing a wide range of stakeholders. However, this paper concludes that Arab CSO attempts to influence cybercrime laws have a limited impact on policy. All experts and activists who were interviewed stated that the space available for civil society to influence the legislative process in th Arab region, including cybercrime law, is limited to “narrow margins surrounded by many challenges. Regimes resort to exploiting security, political, health, and economic conditions to impose martial law and exceptional circumstances that allow for the passage of laws.

CSOs in the Arab region have used a wide range of advocacy methods and tools to lead their campaigns demanding better drafts and respect for human rights standards. These advocacy methods include lobbying, raising awareness, legal advocacy, coalition building, direct action advocacy, international advocacy, and digital or online advocacy. Raising awareness and coalition building were the advocacy methods most frequently usedby CSOs, while lobbying was the least-implemented method, despiteinterviewee statements that this approach is the most effective way to engage with law issuance. Interviewees also evaluated the average effectiveness of their engagement at 3 out of 10, despite noting that their engagement rates were higher than that. 

Advocacy tools identified in the study include statements, training, workshops, petitions, research, meetings, conferences, media reports, international submissions, court trials, etc. in both their offline and online forms. These tools were either implemented as a response to policies or as part of an action plan. Interviewees insisted that adapting advocacy methods and activities should be part of a detailed long-term collaborative strategy in order to maximise achievements and lead sustainable change.

This study also explored the success and challenges of CSOs in their policy-shaping efforts on cybercrime law. While various CSOs have managed to amend some articles of law, the maximum achievement of other CSOs was publishing statements and raising awareness on the violations of the law. Margins of change vary between countries depending on political, economic, and social factors, and they are also governed by multiple challenges. Organisations have identified the lack of political will and hostile governmental responses as main challenges to their attempts to change public policy, alongside other difficulties, such as insufficient technical expertise, limited resources, self-censorship, other existing repressive laws, and poor coordination between organisations.

Recommendations

  • Authorities should demonstrate a commitment to improving the drafting and enforcement of cybercrime laws by incorporating recommendations, reviews, and concerns from CSOs regarding the implications of such laws in the Arab region. 
  • Governments should establish or activate official channels for CSOs to engage in lawmaking processes, recognising the importance of their input. These channels could include consultations and public hearings designed to gather and consider opinions, concerns, and suggestions.
  • CSOs should diversify their advocacy methods to effectively engage in the lawmaking process. This includes utilising direct and grassroots lobbying, which was identified as one of the most effective yet underutilised strategies. While CSOs have heavily relied on raising awareness, coalition building, and international advocacy, these approaches have had limited impact on the creation, modification, or opposition of laws, according to interviewees.
  • CSOs should integrate advocacy methods and tools into broader action plans and strategies, rather than solely reacting to policies as they emerge. Interviewees noted that lacking a clear strategy of change limits the effectiveness of CSO activities. This approach positions activities as goals in themselves, rather than as means to achieve broader impacts, which can undermine the sustainability of their efforts.
  • CSOs should invest in understanding the legislative processes in their countries, which will enhance their ability to engage meaningfully. Some CSOs lack the capacity to understand how the legal system operates, which has hindered their ability to effectively engage with it. A deeper understanding of the legislative process should also take into account the political and economic factors that influence it, helping CSOs identify potential opportunities and breakthroughs for advocacy.

CSOs and international NGOs should engage in ongoing monitoring, documentation, and analysis of cybercrime laws and their implications for human and digital rights. While civic engagement is typically highest during the drafting and issuance of laws, advocacy efforts often decline shortly afterwards, even though the threats posed by such laws persist. Continuous efforts are needed to maintain pressure on the long-term implications of these laws.













International NGO engagement with national CSO campaigns, whether as partners or donors, should prioritise contextual needs, ensuring that local communities are considered when setting priorities and shaping recommendations. In many cases, CSO opposition to repressive laws attempted to mirror donors’ policies and perform activities for purposes of ticking off boxes. Limited dialogue between CSOs and international NGOs on advocacy strategies and methods leads to fragmented campaigns that lack value and relevance within local communities.


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